Here's a bug with a fun name and a boring fix, which is the best kind. Upload2Shell (CVE-2026-125396) is a use-after-free in Ghostscript's Type 1 font loader. A crafted PostScript, PDF or EPS file can escape Ghostscript's -dSAFER sandbox and run commands as whatever account does the rendering. The fix has been out since September. The question is whether every copy of Ghostscript in your environment actually got it.
What the Research Shows
The write-up from Paulos Yibelo and pwn.ai, plus Ostorlab's analysis, lays it out:
- Affected: upstream Ghostscript before 10.08.0, which was released September 8. Distros have backports (Debian and Ubuntu fixed packages are listed in Ostorlab's table).
- CVSS 4.0 8.5, scored as a local attack vector. That undersells it, because the whole point of the research is that remote services feed untrusted files into Ghostscript for you.
-dSAFERdoes not save you. Both write-ups say the exploit clears the very flag-dSAFERrelies on.- The paths the researcher demonstrated (his own tests, not vendor-confirmed unless noted): an anonymous print job to a shared CUPS queue on Debian 13, a Roundcube attachment preview where the victim only views the email, and WordPress plugin upload flows. WordPress core itself confirmed and fixed a related issue (CVE-2026-65640, Author-level upload) in 7.0.4 back in August.
- Exploitation: none known in the wild, and it's not on CISA's KEV list.
Fair note on the drama: on the oss-security list, Jan Schaumann argued the bug should be treated as public since the September release and that the disclosure coordination "leaves much to be desired." Reasonable people can argue about the marketing. What matters for you is that the fix has had two and a half months to reach your servers.
Why This Keeps Happening
Ghostscript is the classic invisible dependency. Nobody installs it on purpose. It arrives with ImageMagick, a PDF thumbnailer, a print server, a document management system or a container base image, and it sits there parsing a full programming language (PostScript) from files strangers upload. We've had this exact conversation about Ghostscript and ImageMagick for a decade. The lesson stays the same: anything that renders untrusted files is an internet-facing parser, whether or not it has a port.
What To Do
- Find every Ghostscript:
gs --version,dpkg-query -W ghostscript,rpm -q ghostscript, andmagick -list delegateto see what ImageMagick hands to it. Don't forget containers and app bundles that ship their own copy; rebuild them. - Patch to 10.08.0 or your distro's fixed package, and update WordPress to 7.0.4 or later (or the 6.9.7 backport).
- If you don't need PostScript, PDF or EPS rendering, turn it off. An ImageMagick policy that denies the
gsdelegate kills the most common path. - Sandbox the renderer: unprivileged user, seccomp or AppArmor, no outbound network.
- Require authentication on shared CUPS queues. Anonymous network printing in 2026 is a choice.
Bottom Line
A fake JPEG shouldn't become a shell, and with a two-month-old patch, it doesn't have to. Go find the Ghostscript you didn't know you had.
Sources: pwn.ai research, Ostorlab, oss-security discussion, Cyber Security News