Supply ChainWeb SecurityData Protection

One Vendor's Script, 178 Websites, One Bad Monday: The Optimizely Compromise

November 17, 2026 · Brian Deitch

This is my security story of the day, and it's the one I'd want every web team to read before lunch.

On Monday, November 16, someone got the ability to write JavaScript into Optimizely customer projects and used it to turn the experimentation snippet on some of the biggest websites in the world into a crypto stealer, a card skimmer and, for some iPhone visitors, an exploit kit delivery system. BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC and Equifax are among the names researchers found serving it.

None of those companies wrote a bad line of code. They loaded a script from a vendor they trusted, which is what every modern website does dozens of times per page.

What Optimizely Said

Optimizely's incident notice, posted early on November 17 UTC and reproduced by Security Affairs, says an unauthorized party "exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation" and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. Its short version: "We've fixed the vulnerability and removed the injected code from affected projects."

What it hasn't said yet: how the vulnerability worked, how many projects were touched, when the fix went in, or what customers should do. I'm not going to guess at any of that.

What Researchers Found

Most of the detail comes from Report URI, which monitors third-party scripts for a living, with independent analysis from StepSecurity (which named it OPTIMJACK) and Cynet:

  • How it was delivered: Optimizely's web snippet has an optional "Project JavaScript" field that runs on every page. The attacker's code went into that field. The rest of the snippet was untouched and still served from Optimizely's own domain and certificate. Report URI says this was not CDN cache poisoning.
  • Timeline (UTC): first injection seen at 04:21 on November 16 on the BBC's snippet. Most sites were cleaned between about 20:40 and 21:10, with one still infected at 21:52. Roughly 17 hours, start to (almost) finish.
  • Scale: Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found 188 infected, belonging to 178 organizations. It thinks the real number is higher.
  • Payload: a crypto "clipper" that swapped wallet addresses on the page, in forms and on the clipboard; from 13:43 UTC, a card skimmer that grabbed card numbers, expiry and CVV from a site's own form fields; and theft of non-HttpOnly cookies plus a screenshot when a swap happened near payment wording.
  • iPhones: iOS visitors were routed to the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits based on their iOS version. Report URI says the kit's own comments mark iOS 18.7.3+ and 26.3+ as patched. Hudson Rock and Cynet both say there's no evidence yet of a successful device compromise, and I'll take that at face value.
  • Money: Report URI counted about $7,000 in crypto received by attacker wallets by Monday evening. StepSecurity's figure is about $6,600.
  • Not alone: an earlier wave from November 13 used scripts from Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media to load a different loader. Report URI links it to the same actor. Nobody has named who that is.

Credit where it's due: Optimizely and its customers cleaned up a mess across 178 organizations in hours, not weeks, and Report URI published a detailed timeline and indicators the same day. That's the system working, late.

The Real Story: You Ship Code You Didn't Write

Every third-party tag on your site (analytics, A/B testing, chat, ads, session replay) runs with the same power as your own code. It can read the page, read the form, read the cookies, and send them wherever it wants. Your users can't tell the difference, and neither can a checkout page that "only allows cdn.optimizely.com."

That last point matters. A Content Security Policy that allowlists a vendor's domain doesn't help when the bad code is coming from the vendor's domain. Report URI notes the loader had three variants, including one that ran inline with eval if the attacker's domain was blocked. Policies that allow 'unsafe-eval' or lean on 'strict-dynamic' gave it room.

I work at Zscaler, so here's my bias in plain view: I think about this from the user side too. A browser that can be told "don't talk to a domain registered six hours ago" catches a lot of this class of attack. But the people who can actually stop it are the ones deciding which scripts get to run on payment pages.

What To Do If You Run a Website

  • If you use Optimizely Web: audit Project JavaScript and experiment code in every project for the indicators Report URI published (start with 1688360.cc and atob(). Ask Optimizely which of your project IDs were changed.
  • Rotate what the snippet could see: session tokens and secrets in non-HttpOnly cookies, plus Optimizely user credentials, API tokens and integration secrets. Review who can edit your projects.
  • Assume cards typed into your own forms on November 16 may be exposed and talk to your payment provider. Cards entered in a hosted payment iframe were out of the skimmer's reach.
  • Keep third-party scripts off checkout and login pages. If a page takes a password or a card, it should load as little outside code as possible.
  • Tighten CSP: restrictive script-src and connect-src, no unsafe-eval, and reporting turned on so you hear about violations from real browsers.
  • Monitor what your scripts actually do, not just where they come from. "Clean now" doesn't mean "clean on Monday."

What To Do If You're a Visitor

  • Update your iPhone and iPad. iOS 18.7.3+ or 26.3+.
  • Verify crypto addresses on a second channel (ideally your hardware wallet screen) before you send anything.
  • Watch your card statements if you bought something online on November 16.

Bottom Line

Your website is a supply chain. Every tag you add is a vendor with write access to your customers' browsers. Fewer scripts on the pages that matter, a real CSP, and monitoring of what runs is how you keep someone else's bad day from becoming yours.

Sources: Report URI, SecurityWeek, Security Affairs, Hackread

optimizelyoptimjackthird-party-javascriptmagecartcard-skimmingcrypto-clippercontent-security-policysupply-chainios
All postsDiscuss on LinkedIn