VulnerabilitiesLinux

Type a Really Long Password, Log In as Anyone: The Alpine OpenSSH Bypass

November 6, 2026 · Brian Deitch

Most authentication bypasses need a clever exploit. This one needs a password between 257 and 1,024 bytes long. That's it. That's the exploit.

What Happened

On November 5, Alpine Linux published an advisory for an authentication bypass in its openssh-server package, and OpenSSH shipped an emergency release (10.6p2) the same day. OpenSSH rates it critical. As of the advisory, "No CVE identifier had been assigned."

The short version of the bug: Alpine uses the musl C library, and musl's crypt() returns * when it's handed a key longer than 256 bytes. On Linux, * is also what's stored in the password field for accounts that have no password, like key-only service accounts. So sshd hashes the attacker's long password, gets *, compares it to the stored *, and says "looks good to me."

Per Alpine, the attack needs:

  • An account whose password field is * (no password set).
  • At least one other account on the machine with a real $5$ or $6$ password hash.
  • Password authentication enabled without PAM, which is the default for Alpine's openssh-server.

The bug was reported by Özgün Kültekin of Wakefield. No attacks have been reported so far.

Who's Affected

Alpine servers running the standard openssh-server with password authentication on. Not affected, per Alpine: systems using PAM (UsePAM yes), cloud-init images that set PasswordAuthentication no, accounts locked with !, and containers that don't run sshd. glibc-based distros aren't affected, because this is a musl behavior meeting an sshd assumption.

One nasty detail: Alpine's tiny-cloud images from 3.18.11 through 3.24.3 ship an alpine user with a * password and passwordless doas. Safe on first boot. But the moment anyone sets a password for any other account, that box has both ingredients, and the alpine account is one doas away from root.

Why This One Is Sneaky

Alpine is everywhere you don't look: base container images, appliances, jump boxes somebody built in 2022, the little VM running a tool nobody owns anymore. It's popular precisely because it's small and forgettable. Forgettable is the problem.

And the root cause is a classic. Two components each behave reasonably on their own, and the combination is a hole. The C library returns a sentinel value, the SSH server treats that same value as a valid stored hash. Nobody wrote "let people in with long passwords." It just happened at the seam.

This is also another vote for not having SSH reachable from the internet at all. (Usual disclosure: I work at Zscaler, so weigh my bias.) A bug like this only matters if an attacker can reach port 22. Put admin access behind an identity-aware broker and an auth bypass in sshd is a patch-this-week problem instead of a patch-this-hour problem.

What To Do

  • Upgrade and restart. apk upgrade -U -a, then rc-service sshd restart. Alpine is explicit: upgrading the package does not restart a running sshd. Fixed point releases are 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8 and 3.24.4, and older branches back to 3.16 have patched packages.
  • Can't upgrade right now? Set PasswordAuthentication no, check with sshd -t, and restart sshd. If you only use keys, you should have done this years ago anyway.
  • Check your tiny-cloud images. Rebuild from the fixed releases, and look hard at any instance where someone added a password.
  • Look for evidence. Search /var/log/messages for Accepted password for on accounts that shouldn't have a password. Alpine's advice: "If you cannot rule out a login, treat the machine as compromised."
  • Find your Alpine. Inventory containers and VMs that actually run sshd. The answer is probably "more than you think."

Update, November 7: It has a name, a CVE and real attacks. The flaw is now CVE-2026-123158 ("SSHole," CVSS 8.1), and the scope is wider than Alpine: SecurityWeek lists OpenWrt, Buildroot, Yocto and other musl-based builds with PAM disabled. Previdian reported the first exploitation attempt less than nine hours after the CVE was published and confirmed root on an Alpine honeypot, with the source running id, uname and hostname over non-interactive SSH sessions. OpenSSH's Damien Miller said the team "learned of the problem yesterday" before shipping 10.6p2, citing recent cases of AI agents rediscovering bugs within hours. If you haven't upgraded and restarted sshd, do it now, and check embedded and router builds, not just servers. (The Hacker News, SecurityWeek, NVD CVE-2026-123158)

Update, November 12: The federal deadline is today. CISA added SSHole to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 9 and gave federal civilian agencies until November 12 to fix it. The post-exploitation picture is clearer too. GreyNoise says it logged 16 successful exploitation chains from six source IPs, starting November 7 at 00:46 UTC, roughly 40 hours after the fix. Attackers ran recon, queried cloud metadata services, tried to read password hashes and root SSH keys, and edited authorized_keys for persistence. In one case an attacker got root and installed "TAC Agent," a Python command-and-control agent, set up as a startup service. watchTowr says it has seen SSHole used for botnet and cryptominer activity. Activity is still described as limited, not widespread. If you haven't already: upgrade to 10.6p2 and restart sshd, or disable password authentication, then check for successful password logins to accounts whose /etc/shadow field is *, unexpected SSH keys, and unfamiliar startup services. (The Hacker News, BleepingComputer)

Bottom Line

A password so long it's no password at all. Upgrade, restart sshd (seriously, restart it), turn off password auth where you don't need it, and stop exposing SSH to the whole internet.

Sources: Alpine Linux security advisory, Alpine 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8 and 3.24.4 release notes, OpenSSH release notes, and The Hacker News

opensshalpine-linuxmuslauthentication-bypasssshcontainerstiny-cloudlinux
All postsDiscuss on LinkedIn