A Russian intelligence crew built a mobile exploit operation, wired it into a web analytics script, and pointed it at phones. The twist: every single bug they used was already fixed. They weren't beating Apple and Google. They were beating your update settings.
What Happened
On November 4, Sekoia published research on a campaign it calls Poisoned Source, which it uncovered in mid-October. Sekoia's attribution: "we assess with moderate to high confidence that this campaign was conducted by APT29," the group also known as Midnight Blizzard and Cozy Bear.
Visitors reached the exploit infrastructure three ways:
- Compromised legitimate websites carrying injected JavaScript. Sekoia notes some were picked for high-value visitors, including military and defense-related sites.
- Lookalike domains tied to diplomatic and high-profile events, such as america250[.]holiday.
- A supply chain hit on Plerdy, a Ukrainian SEO and analytics tracker. Between August 27 and September 3, 2026, the tracker script at a.plerdy[.]com served malicious code to every site that loaded it.
Once a phone landed on the page, the infrastructure served a platform-specific exploit chain. No click needed.
Three Chains, Zero Zero-Days
Sekoia sorts the payloads into three classes:
- Class A, iOS 16.7: CVE-2025-43529 (WebKit) plus CVE-2024-27834 (a Pointer Authentication bypass). Steals browser cookies.
- Class B, iOS 18.5 (the DarkSword kit): five chained CVEs. Pulls basically everything: messages, mail, WhatsApp and Telegram data, Keychain, Safari history, photos, location data, iCloud Drive.
- Class C, Android with Chrome 139 to 145: CVE-2026-3910 plus an Adreno GPU driver bug, CVE-2025-27038. Steals Chrome cookies, saved logins and history, plus Wi-Fi passwords.
The line that matters most, straight from Sekoia: "All three exploit chains rely entirely on known, already-patched vulnerabilities. None of them contain zero-days."
CISA Joined In
On November 4, CISA added CVE-2024-27834 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Apple fixed it back in May 2024 (iOS and iPadOS 17.5, macOS Sonoma 14.5, Safari 17.5, and 16.7.8 for older iPhones). Federal agencies have until November 18 to patch. A two-and-a-half-year-old bug, used by a nation-state, today. That's the n-day economy in one sentence.
Targeted or Spray and Pray?
Sekoia isn't sure, and says so: "It remains unclear whether the attackers intended to target visitors to specific websites or sought to compromise as many unpatched mobile devices as possible." The Plerdy compromise was broad by nature. The lookalike domains and defense sites look picked. My read is both: cast a wide net, then see who's interesting. Either way, if your executives browse on old iOS, they were in range.
Why This Should Bother Security Teams
Three things jump out.
Phones are the softest high-value target you own. They hold mail, MFA apps, session cookies, chats, and they're often the least managed device in the company. Stealing cookies is the point: a valid session token skips the password and the MFA prompt entirely.
Third-party scripts are a supply chain. I wrote on Monday about a registrar compromise turning trusted scripts into weapons. Same lesson here. Every analytics tag on your website is someone else's code running in your visitors' browsers.
Patched isn't the same as updated. Every bug was fixed. The attack still worked, because fixed on the vendor's side and installed on the device are two different events.
Usual disclosure: I work at Zscaler, so weigh my bias. But the zero trust point here doesn't need a product. Treat a session cookie like a credential, tie access to device posture, and don't let a device running a two-year-old OS reach sensitive apps just because the user has a valid token.
What To Do
- Enforce minimum OS versions for mobile devices that reach corporate apps. iOS 16.7 and 18.5 were the targets here, and both have fixes.
- Update Chrome on Android, and check that Android security patches are actually landing on your fleet, not just available.
- Turn on Lockdown Mode for high-risk users on iOS: executives, diplomats, defense, people who travel to sensitive places.
- Shorten session lifetimes and bind sessions to device where your identity provider allows it, so a stolen cookie has less value.
- Audit third-party scripts on your own websites. Know which tags load, from where, and use Subresource Integrity or a content security policy where you can.
- Check your logs for traffic to a.plerdy[.]com during late August and early September, and to ad.starx-net[.]com, the exfiltration host Sekoia identified.
Bottom Line
APT29 built a nation-state mobile operation out of bugs anyone could have patched. That's not a story about how clever they are. It's a story about how long devices stay unpatched. Update the phones. Then check that they actually updated.
Sources: Sekoia, Poisoned Source, The Hacker News on the APT29 campaign, The Hacker News on the CISA KEV addition, and NVD, CVE-2024-27834